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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Historically, cryptography has been used to send secret messages. The 
sender converts the message into something incomprehensible that only the 
intended recipient can convert back into its original text. Today, cryptog-
raphy is not only used to send private information, but it is also used to 
digitally sign documents. A digital signature is used as verification when 
someone sends a message; it ensures that the message actually came from 
the sender and not an impersonator. 
As cryptosystems have been invented, the issue of security has contin-
uously arisen. We are always asking how much information is required to 
lead a successful attack against the system. Do we have a secure method for 
exchanging keys which encrypt and decrypt messages? Do issues of security 
lie in the algorithm used for encryption? Different types of problems crop 
up from different types of cryptosystems. In private-key cryptosystems, the 
same key is used for encrypting the message as for decrypting the message. 
The sender and receiver must both agree upon the key, so concerns of safety 
occur in the transmission of secret keys. On the other hand, in a public-key 
cryptosystem, the encryption and decryption keys are different. This mea.ns 
the encryption key can be published and problems of security lie elsewhere. 
1.1 RSA 
RSA is a popular public-key cryptosystem created in 1977 by Ron Rivest, 
Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman; the name originates from the first initial 
of each last name. The algorithm generates a.n integer, n, which is to become 
our modulus, by taking the product of two very large distinct primes, p and 
q; that is, n = p·q. In present day use, n is about 300 digits or greater. Next, 
~(n) is calculated by ~(n) = (p -1)(q -1). Then, an encryption exponent, 
e, is chosen such that 1 < e < ~(n) where e and ~(n) are relatively prime; in 
other words, gcd(e, ~(n)) = 1. Our decryption exponent, which we shall call 
d, is chosen such that ed = 1 (mod ~(n)); that is, e = cr1 (mod ~(n)). We 
will make our encryption exponent, e, and modulus, n, public so that anyone 
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who wishes to send a message is able to do so. We keep d and ,P( n) private. 
The following table is a summary of the elements used in this algorithm. 
Element Computation Published? 
p,q random distinct primes private 
n n=p·q public 
,P(n) ,P(n) = (p- 1)(q -1) private 
e gcd(e, ,P(n)) = 1 public 
d ed: 1 (mod ,P(n)) private 
When someone wants to send a message, say M, they will compute 
Me (mod n) = C, where C is the encrypted text. The message M will 
probably be blocks of letters that have been converted into numbers using 
some method. Each block will then be raised to the encrypting exponent 
e. The encrypted message will then be sent to the intended receiver and 
the receiver will decrypt the message by computing (Jd (mod n). It can be 
shown that cJd (mod n) will indeed decrypt the message. 
Theorem 1.1.1. If ed = 1 (mod ,P(n)) and if a message, M, has been 
encrypted using RSA where Me (mod n) = C, then Cd (mod n) will decrrtPt 
the message. 
Proof. We will first use the arithmetic representation of modular arithmetic 
to note that ed : 1 (mod ,P(n)) implies ed = 1 + k,P(n) where k e Z. 
Also, we will use Euler's Theorem, whi~ states that if gcd(a, n) = 1, then 
alfl(n) = 1 (mod n). Our equation for decryption becomes 
d _ Med (mod n) 
- Ml+kl/l(n) (mod n) 
_ M · M1clfl(n) (mod n) 
- M (modn). 
D 
How does RSA become insecure? Our attack is to find the secret de. 
cryption exponent, d. Due to the size of n, it is not reasonable to try a 
brute force attack by inputting random values for d, as this can take too 
much time. Remember that n and e have been published, so if we are able 
to factor n then we can break into the system. By factoring n = p · q, we 
will be able to find ,P(n) by computing ,P(n) = (p- 1)(q- 1). We can then 
find d by computing d = e-1 (mod ,P(n)). Once dis found, the attack has 
been successful. 
Algorithms designed to multiply integers are incredibly easy to imple. 
ment and the running time is very fast; RSA is no exception to this. How-
ever, factoring integers is much more difficult and time consuming. RSA 
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is secure because of the amount of time required for factoring n. When 
attempting to factor integers that are the size of the integers used in RSA, 
approximately 300 digits or bigger, simple trial division can take longer than 
we are willing to wait. Mathematicians have been inventing and improving 
factorization methods to reduce the running time to something more rea-
sonable. We will examine two factorization methods, the first of which is 
the Quadratic Sieve. 
3 
Chapter 2 
Quadratic Sieve 
Currently, the Quadratic Sieve (QS) is considered to be the second fastest 
factoring algorithm and the Number Field Sieve is considered to be the 
fastest. We shall examine QS w,hich was developed by Carl Pomerance in 
the early 1980's. It is a clliect descendant of the continued fraction factoring 
method of Brillhart and Morrison. QS is used to factor large numbers rang-
ing from 50 digits to over 150 digits. Most famously, in 1994, the Quadratic 
Sieve was able to factor the 129-digit RSA challenge number which was 
published in 1977. It took about 600 computers connected over the internet 
and about 45 hours for the data processing phase. RSA-129 is listed below: 
1143816257578888676692357799761466120102182967212423625625618429 
5706935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 
This number was the product of two primes, one of which was 64 digits 
and the other was 65 digits. The two prime factors are: 
34905295108476509491478496199038 98133417764638493387843990820577 
-and-
32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 
The goal of the Quadratic Sieve is to factor an odd composite integer, n. 
It is assumed that if we are using QS, then primality teats have already 
revealed that n is of this form. 
2.1 Fermat's Algorithm 
Pierre de Fermat invented a simple factorization method which involves 
taking differences of squares. Let us assume that n = ab, where a and b are 
not necessarily prime divisors of n. That is, we can write n as a product 
of two ·integers. H we can represent n = z2 - y2, then we can rewrite n 
such that n = (x- y)(x + y) and we ha.~ succeeded in breaking n into two 
factors. In fact, if n is odd, a safe assumption, then a and b must be odd. 
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Let :z: = ~ and y = 4 2b, which we lmow to be integers since a and b are 
odd. Then 
z2-.J - (a;b)2 _ (a;b) 2 
= 
a2 + 2ab+ ~- (a2 - 2ab+ ~) 
4 
4ab 
= 4 
- ab 
-
n. 
This shows that an odd composite integer, n, can always be represented as 
the difference of two squares. To find :z: and y such that n = :r;2 - y2, we will 
start with :z: = f v'fil and compute :r;2- n = Yl· If we started with an integer 
less than .;n, then calculating :z:2 - n will produce a. negative number. If 
Yl can be expressed as y2, then we have found factors. Otherwise, we will 
increment :z: to :r; + 1, :r; + 2, ... , :r; + j, until we find Yt such that Yi = y2• 
Example 2.1.1 (Fermat's Algorithm). Let us try} to factor n = 1219. First, 
find :r; = r v'12I9l = 35. We start by computing :r:2 - n = 352 - 1219. If our 
solution is not a square, then we try :z: + 1. We then calculate 362 - 1219. 
If our result iB a square then we are done; if not, we try :r; + 2. Below iB a 
table of our computations. 
:r; :z:2 -1219 y2 'I 
95 6 no 
96 77 no 
97 150 no 
98 ee5 yes! 
For y = 15, we find that 98 can be expressed as :r:2 -y2 = n. We have 
:r;2 - y2 - 382 - 152 
= (38- 15)(38 + 15) 
- 23 · 53 
= 1219 
Thus, we have successfully factored our integer, n, as 1219 = 23 · 53. 
It is possible that Fermat's Algorithm will take a very long time and it 
is not guaranteed to work for composite integers that are even. For RSA, 
since n = p • q, then :r; will be somewhere between r v'fil and (~) The 
algorithm can be generalized to save time. 
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2.2 Kraitchik's Improvement 
Maurice Kraitchik improved Fermat's algorithm by searching for arbitrary x 
andy satisfying z2 = y2 (mod n) where z ::/: ±y. The reduction of modular 
arithmetic allows for the poBBibility of finding smaller values for x and y 
that satisfy this equation compared to the size of the z and y that may be 
required for Fermat's Algorithm. If z2 = y2 (mod n}, then this means that 
n divides z 2 - 71'; that is, n divides (z- y)(x + y). We know that n shares 
a common factor with (z- y)(z + y), so we can compute gcd(z- y,n) or 
gcd(z+y, n) to find this factor. We have a good chance that gcd(z±y, n) = d 
where d ::/: 1 or n. If gcd(z ± y, n) = 1 or n, then z = ±y (mod n) and we 
do not get a useful factorization [1] . 
Example 2.2.1 (Kraitchik's Imrovement). Let us trrJ to factor n = 5713. 
First, find f v'5713l = 76. We shall start by computing 762 (mod 5713). If 
our solution is not a square, we will trrJ z+1 = 77. Compute 7"fJ (mod 5713}, 
and if our result is a square then we are done. Othenoise, continue incre-
menting z by1 until we hatJe found a y2 (mod 5713). It takes 66 iterations 
before we hatJe found a solution. Below is a table with a few computations. 
:t 76 77 78 ... 141 14! 
z 2 (mod 5713) 63 !16 371 ... !74! 30145 
Since 3025 = 552 is a perfect square, then we hatJe found a solution. We 
hatJe satisfied the equation z 2 = y (mod 5713) with 1422 = 552 (mod 5713). 
This means that 5719 will ditJide (142- 55)(142 +55), so we can compute 
gcd(142- 55, 5713) ;., 29 and gcd(142 +55, 5713) = 197. We hatJe success-
fully factored 5713 = 29 · 197. 
Kraitchik's idea can be improved further. It is possible to reduce the 
amount oftime it takes to find a congruence such that x2 = y'1. (mod n). If 
we have a list of congruences, 
z¥ = a1 (mod n) 
x~ = 42 (mod n) 
z~ = as (mod n) 
~ = a; (mod n), 
instead of computing x~ until we find a; = 'If, then perhaps we can combine 
some of these congruences by taking their product. For example, we may 
be able to find 
z¥ · z~ · z~6 - (:tl · xs · z1s)2 
- a1 · as • a1s (mod n) 
_ y2 (mod n}. 
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If ::r:1 • X3 • X15 :#: ±y, then we have successfully found integers :z: and y that 
will be helpful in factoring n. In general, we want to find congruences of the 
form ~ = eli (mod n) where II eli is a square, namely 7l'. If :z: = n x., then 
we have the congruence :z:2 = 7l' (mod n). Finding such a coDgruence is the 
goal of the quadratic sieve. 
Example 2.2.2 (Improvement to Kraitchik). Again, let us try to factor 
n = 5713. Previously, it took 66 iterations of x before we found an :z: such 
that .:z:2 = y2 (mod 5713), but combining congroences requires a lot fewer 
iterations for X. We will begin again with X = r v'5ml = 16 and compute 
762 (mod 5713). The table below shows the first 10 iterations for x. 
:z; 16 77 78 79 80 81 8S 89 8-l 85 
:z:2 (mod 5713) 69 S16 971 5S8 687 8.l8 1011 1176 1949 151S 
Taking the product of ::r: = 77 and x = 83, we ha11e the following congru-
ence: 
(772 . 832) = (216 · 1176) (mod 5713) 
We can ezpress 216·1176 (mod 5713) into its prime factors. Our congroence 
becomes 
(772 • 832) = (26 • 34 • 72) (mpd 5713) 
(77 · 83)2 = (28 • 32 · 7)2 (mod 5713) 
6782 = 5042 (mod 5713) 
Our equation is now of the form x2 = y2 (mod 5713). We can find 
gcd(678 - 504, 5713) = 29 and gcd(678 + 504, 5713) = 197 which means 
we ha11e successfully factored 5713 = 29 · 197. This impro11ement took a lot 
fewer steps than Example S.S.J; we only examined 10 iterations before we 
were able to find a combination of congruences. 
2.3 Quadratic Residues 
There are a few more ideas that we will need to discuss before moving on 
to the algorithm for the quadratic sieve. First, we shall discuss quadratic 
residues. Quadratic residues allow us to determine whether we will be able 
to solve x2 =a (mod p) for some integer a and prime p. 
Definition 2.3.1 (Quadratic Residue). GitJen an integer a and a prime 
modulus p, if gcd(a,p) = 1 and if there e:z:ists an integer :z: such that x2 =a 
(mod p), then a is a quadratic residue mod p. If no such ::r: exists, then a 
is a quadratic nonresidue mod p. 
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It is helpful to see this concept demonstrated with an example. 
Example 2.3.1 (Quadratic Residues). Let p = 11, then we can make a 
table of the congruences x2 = a (mod 11). We will try the set of integers 
x E { 1, ~' 9, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0} and find the values for a. 
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a = x2 (mod 11) 1 4 9 5 3 3 5 9 4 1 
Table 2.1: Congruences x2 (mod 11) 
The quadratic residues (mod 11) are given b1/ those values a such that 
for some x, a= x2 (mod 11); the quadratic residues are listed in the second 
row of Thble IJ.1: {1, 9, 4, 5, 9}. The quadratic nonresidues (mod 11) are 
{.e, 6, 7, 8, 10}. 
Theorem 2.3.1. Assume a is a quadratic residue (mod p) where pis an odd 
prime. There are exactly two square roots, ±t, such that a= t2 (mod p). 
Proof. Let a be a quadratic residue (mod p), and lett be a square root of 
a (mod p); that is, t2 = a (mod p}. Then -t is also a square root of a 
(mod p), and t -=F -t (mod p) since p f 2t (since p is odd and t < p). Thus, 
a has at least 2 distinct square roots (mod p}. 
Let s be any square root of a (mod p). Then s2 = t2 =a (mod p). This 
implies that p I s2 - t2, so p I (s - t)(s + t). Since p is a prime, either 
p I (s- t), in which case s = t (mod p) or p I (s + t), in which case s = -t 
(mod p). Since s was an arbitrary square root of a, then ±tare the only 
square roots of a (mod p). 0 
The following definition creates a notation we can use when discussing 
quadratic residues. 
Definition 2.3.2 (Legendre Symbol (;)). Let p be an odd prime and let 
gcd(a,p} = 1. The Legendre symbol<;> is defined to be: 
(
a) { 1 if a is a quadratic residue of p 
P = -1 if a is a quadratic nonresidue of p 
Returning to Example 2.3.1 and using Table 2.1, if we wanted to state 
whether 3 was a quadratic residue (mod 11), we would write the Legendre 
symbol {f1 ) = 1. However, the Legendre symbol (/i) = -1 denotes that 6 
is a quadratic nonresidue (mod 11). 
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2.4 Quadratic Sieve Algorithm 
The ultimate goal of the quadratic sieve is to find an :c and 71 such that 
:c2 =,; (mod n), where n is the integer we are trying to factor. We want to 
create a list of all :c, where :c2 - n is completely factored by a set of primes. 
Limiting the prime factorization of x2 - n reduces the amount of time that it 
takes to find a y that satisfies :c2 = y2 (mod n). It is possible to determine 
if some prime, p, divides x2 - n without having to factor x. 
Begin by choosing a bound, B, that will limit the number of primes that 
will be examined. It is important to choose B large enough so that enough 
primes are being considered, but small enough so that the running time is 
not too long. Next, find where the Legendre symbol(~)= 1. That is, we 
want to find the primes, p, where n is a quadratic res1due (mod p); these 
primes will make up the set that we call our factor base. The primes that 
are quadratic nonresiduee will be thrown out because they will never divide 
x2 -n. Next, solve for the values oft, where t~ = n (mod p) for every prime 
in the factor base. This can be done using an algorithm designed to find 
square roots (mod p) (see [2]). 
We can determine if a prime p divides x2 - n without having to do 
division. 
Theorem 2.4.1. If n is a quadratic residue (mod p}, then p, will ditlide 
:c2 - n if and only if :c = ±t (mod p). 
Proof. => Assume the prime p divides r - n for some :Cj then we know that 
:c2 = n (mod p). Since n is a quadratic residue (mod p), then by Theorem 
2.3.1 there exist integers ±t such that t2 ·= n (mod p). Using substitution 
we have the equation :c2 = t2 (mod p), which implies x = ±t (mod p) . 
<= Now assume :c = ±t (mod p). By the properties of modular arith-
metic, x2 = t 2 (mod p). Since ±t solves the congruence t2 = n (mod p), 
then it follows from substitution that z2 = n (mod p). Thus, p divides 
r-~ o 
One last consideration that must be made is the interval for x. We 
want to choose an interval where xis near Vfi. Instead of beginning with 
X = r y'nl, as we did in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we can center our interval 
around Vii to ensure that x2 - n remains relatively small and more likely 
to contain only factors in our factor base. This will return some negative 
numbers for :z:2- n; however, including -1 in the factor base will account for 
these values. 
'lb begin sieving, start with the first prime in the factor base, look for 
the first :c in the interval such that x = ±t (mod p) and record p for this :c. 
Instead of searching for the next x in the interval that satisfies the equation 
x = ±t (mod p), we can simply add p to the first z that we found. The 
prime p will also be a factor of (z + p)2 - n. In fact, p will always divide 
(:c +kp)2 - n fork E Z. 
9 
Theorem 2.4.2. If p divides (x2 - n), then p will o.lso divide (x + kp)2 - n 
forkeZ 
Proof. Assume x = ±t (mod p); then we know x2 = n (mod p). For k E Z, 
the expansion of (x + kp)2 yields 
(x + kp)2 _ x2 + 2xkp + (kp)2 (mod p) 
- x2 (mod p) 
= n (modp) 
Thus, p must also divide {x + kp)2 - n. 0 
For each x, we record the primes p such that p divides x2 - n. We can 
also check to see if higher powers of p divide z2-n for each x in the interval. 
When all of the primes in the factor base have been used, only the integers, 
x, for which x2 - n has been completely factored by the primes in the factor 
base will be kept. 
Remember, our aim is to find x andy where x2 = y2 (mod n). After 
sieving, we are left with a bunch of values for x. Which ones do we choose 
to guarantee that the product is a square (mod n)? The answer lies in 
the exponents. Each z2 - n has been represented by a product of primes 
(and possibly -1) raised to some power. That is, x2 - n = IJ P:', where 
Pl 1 P:z, ... , Pi are the primes (and possibly -1) in the factor base. We can 
write an exponent vector, (e1, e2, .. . , ~) that corresponds to each x2 - n. 
Adding some combination of exponent vectors is equivalent to taking the 
product of the prime factors. Since we're only concerned with finding a 
product that is a square (mod n), we can reduce the exponent vectors 
(mod 2). We will want to add some combination that adds to the zero 
vector (mod 2}. Fbr simplicity, we can put them into a matrix. If we have 
more vectors than the number of integers in the factor base, then we are 
guaranteed linear dependence. We can use algorithms from linear algebra 
to find such a dependence. If we do not find a dependence, then the interval 
over which we sieve can be enlarged, or the factor base can be extended to 
include more primes. Once a combination has been found, then we will let 
z2 be the product of x values and y2 be the product of the prime factors. 
We have now found x and 11 to satisfy the equation z2 = y2 (mod n). As 
in Section 2.2, we can find gcd(x ± y, n) = d. This signifies a successful 
factorization for n [2]. 
2.5 Example of Quadratic Sieve 
We shall try to factor the integer n = 82052437 using the Quadratic Sieve. 
Although 8 digits is very small, it will suffice for a demonstration. 'lb avoid 
large integers, we will choose a bound of B = 25, meaning we will only try 
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the first 25 primes. When we compute the Legendre Symbol for the fixst 25 
primes and n, we find that n is a quadratic residue for 20 of the primes. The 
set of all of the primes where it is possible for p to divider -n is denoted by 
our factor base, F = {2, 3,11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 31, 37,41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 
71, 73, 83, 89}. 
To find which prime divides r - n, first solve for t in the equation 
t2 = 82052437 (mod p) for each prime pin F . Table 2.2 on page 14 contains 
a list of the primes in the factor base and their corresponding values for t. 
Note that if t satisfies the congruence t 2 = n (mod p) then -t (mod p) 
also satisfies this congruence. For example, if we are looking at the prime 
11, we compute 82052437 = 5 (mod 11). For t = 4, we can check that 
42 = 16 = 5 (mod 11). Similarly, 'fJ = 49 = 5 (mod 11), and that indeed 
7 = -4 (mod 11). This means that for every x such that x = ±4 (mod 11), 
then 11 will divide x2 - 82052437. 
Next, we choose the interval over which we will sieve. We want to choose 
an interval centered around J 82052437. Compute x = L J 82052437J = 9058 
and sieve over the interval x - 100 to x + 100. That is, the interval from 
8958 to 9158. This interval is fairly small, but we can expand it if necessary. 
Since we will be sieving with integers less than ¥ 82052437, then we will 
include -1 into our factor base. 
Start the sieve by recording -1 next to each x ::5 9058 to account for 
all of the x values that will generate a negative integer when calculating 
r - 82052437. The next step is to sieve by the prime 2. Notice that since 
82052437 is odd, then x2 - 82052437 will only be even when x is odd. In 
fact, we can record 22 because x2 - 82052437 will be divisible by 22 for each 
oddx. 
Theorem 2.5.1. If x u an odd integer, then x2 - 82052437 u ditlisible l1y 
22 but no higher power of e. 
Proof. Let x be an odd integer. Then we can represent x as x = 2k + 1 for 
some k ez. 
x2 - 82052437 (mod 22) _ x2 - 1 (mod 22) 
- (2k + 1)2 -1 (mod 22) 
- 4k2 + 4k + 1 - 1 (mod 22) 
- 0 (mod 22) 
Thus, for every odd x, x2 - 82052437 is divisible by 22 . It can be shown 
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that z2 - 82052437 will not be divisible by ~. 
x2 - 82052437 (mod ~) _ x2 - 5 (mod ~) 
- (2k + 1)2 - 5 (mod 23) 
- 4k2 + 4k + 1 - 5 (mod 23) 
- 4k2 +4k- 4 (mod 23) 
_ 4(k2 + k- 1) (mod 23) 
This last statement would be true only if (k2 + k -1) = 2j for some j E Z. 
That is, if~+ k- (2j + 1) = 0 has integer roots. 
Assume ~+k-(2j+l) = Ohas integer roots, a and b. Then a·b = 2j+1, 
which implies a and b must be odd. H a and b are odd, then a + b = k 
implies k must be even and it follows that k2 would also be even. However, 
the sum of two even integers mi:nus an odd integer will never equal 0. Thus, 
~ + k- (2j + 1) = 0 does not have any integer roots. Therefore,~ does 
not divide z2 - 82052437 for any :z;. The proof for powers higher than 3 is 
&mW~. 0 
We sieve by the next prime in the factor base which is 3. We are looking 
for the values of x such that 3 divides x2 - n by looking for the first value 
where x = ±t (mod 3). Recall from Table 2.2 on page 14 that the values 
for t ~e 1 and 2, so we ~e looking for :z; that satisfies the equation x = 1 
(mod 3) or x = 2 (mod 3). Once we find the first x that satisfies x = 1 
(mod 3) or x = 2 (mod 3), we record a 3 with that x and with every x+3k, 
k E Z, until x + 3k > 9158. 
In general, we will find the first x = ±t (mod p) for each prime in our 
factor base, recordp with that partie~ x and for every x+kp. We will also 
check for higher powers of each prime. Once we ~e done, we will eliminate 
those values of x where z2 - 82052437 cannot be completely factored by the 
primes in the factor base. Table 2.3 on page 15 shows the values of x that 
remained after the sieve and the prime factorizations for z2 - 82052437. 
Now that the sieving portion is complete, write each prime factorization 
for x2 - 82052437 as an exponent vector, then reduce each vector (mod 2), 
and form a. matrix of these vectors. The columns of the matrix represent 
each integer in the factor base beginning with -1. Each row corresponds to 
each x that remained after the sieve. This matrix can be seen in Figure 2.1 
on page 16. 
We now want to find a combination of rows that will add to the zero 
vector (mod 2). We can use the combination of the four rows corresponding 
to z = 9023,9031,9076, and 9113. We will use Table 2.3 to find the prime 
factorization of z2- 82052437 for each z. Taking the product of the four x's 
yields the congruence (9023 · 9031· 9076 · 9113)2 = ( -1· 23 • 32 ·17 · 41· 43 · 4 7 · 
53 · 59)2 (mod 82052437). After multiplying and reducing (mod 82052437), 
our congruence becomes 134997232 = 685527142 (mod 82052437) . 
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We have a.n :z: and 11 that satisfy the equation z2 = 112 (mod 82052437), 
in particular :z: = 68552714 and 11 = 13499723. However, upon inspection 
we see that :z: = -11 (mod 82052437). This means that the computation 
gcd(68552714 - 13499723, 82052437) = 1 and we haven't found a useful 
factorization. We want to use a different combination of rows that add to 
the zero vector. 
Notice that one of the rows is already equal to the zero vector.1 This row 
corresponds to :z: = 9061 and looking at Table 2.3, :r;2 - 82052437 has prime 
factoriza.tion22 ·32 ·3r2. Wenowhave90612 = (22 -32 ·372) (mod 82052437). 
We can rewrite this equation as 90612 = (2 · 3 · 37)2 (mod 82052437). 
Thus, we have found a.nnother :r; and 11 that satisfy the equation :r;2 = 112 
(mod 8}2052437, in particular :z: = 9061 and 11 = 222. We can com-
pute gcd(9061 - 222, 82052437) = 8839 and gcd(9061 + 222, 82052437) = 
9283. We have successfully factored our integer n into the two primes 
n = 8839 · 9283. 
1 For appropriately aized integera, it is ra.re for the matrix to have a row equal to the 
zero vector (mod 2). In thoae caaea, it would be neceaaary to find a different combination 
of rowa to add to the zero vector. 
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p t where t2 = 82052437 (mod p) 
2 1 
3 1, 2 
11 4, 7 
13 5,8 
17 4, 13 
19 5, 14 
23 11,12 
31 5, 26 
37 4,33 
41 11,30 
43 3,40 
47 5,42 
53 13,40 
59 4,55 
61 19,42 
67 4,63 
71 3, 68 
73 27,46 
1-
83 31, 52 
89 20,69 
Table 2.2: Integers t for t 2 = 82052437 (mod p) 
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:I; prime factors 
:c2- 82052437 
8972 -1 . 3. 11 . 17. 47. 59 
8982 -1 . 19 . 23. 47. 67 
8995 -1 . 22 • 3 . 31. 37. 83 
9009 -1 . 22 • 41. 61 . 89 
9014 
-1·3·13·1r2·11 
9016 -1 . 33 • 11 · 31 · 83 
9020 -1· 33 ·192 . 71 
9023 -1 . 22 . 3 . 17 . 53 . 59 
9027 -1 . 22 • 11 . 13 . 23. 43 
9031 -1·22 ·3·17·41·59 
9047 -1· 22 .33 • 31· 61 
9049 -1·22 ·3·11·19·67 
9050 -1 . 3 . 23 . 41 . 53 
9057 -1 . 22 • 11 . 17. 31 
9058 -1· 3 ·19. 89 
9061 22.32. 372 
9070 32 .43. 61 
9074 36 ·17. 23 
9076 3. 43.47. 53 
9079 22 . 32 . 11 . 13 . 73 
9082 3 . 11 . 13 . 17 . 59 
9091 22 • 3 . 17 . 41 . 71 
9098 3. 37.73. 89 
9108 13 ·17. 61· 67 
9113 22 • 3 . 41 . 43 . 47 
9119 22 • 32 . 23 . 31 . 43 
9134 3. 11. 132 • 19 
9156 11·43·53·11 
Table 2.3: Integers remaining after sieve 
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1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
o o o o. o 1 o 1 o o o o o o o o o o· o o o 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
o o 1 o o o o o o 1 o o o o o ·o o o 1 o 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Figure 2.1: Matrix of exponent vectors (mod 2) 
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Chapter 3 
Elliptic Curve Method 
·The second method of factorization that we shall examine is the Elliptic 
Curve Method (ECM). This exciting use of elliptic curves to factor numbers 
was published by H.W. Lenstra, Jr. in 1987. ECM does not rely heavily 
on the size of the number to be factored, but rather on the size of the 
least prime factor. In comparison, the quadratic sieve does depend on the 
size of the integer being factored. The ECM algorithm works best to find 
"small" to ''medium" sized factors; that is, factors around 15 to 30 digits. 
The terms "small" and ''medium" are used in a relative sense; while many 
would view a 15-digit number as quite long, this is rather small in the world 
of cryptography. Often, ECM is used to remove small factors from a very 
large integer with many factors. Therefore, it may not have practical use 
in RSA because the public modulus n is the product of two large primes p 
and q. However, ECM can be applied to other cryptosystems. As of March 
2909, the largest factor found using ECM was 67 digits [6]. Before going 
through the details of the Elliptic Curve Method, we shall begin with a few 
c::oncepts that will be important in the algorithm. 
3.1 Smooth Numbers 
We will first examine the concept of a smooth number. Smooth numbers 
are extremely useful tools in shortening the amount of time it takes to run 
through an algorithm. 
Definition S.l.l (Smooth Number). A positi~e integer is said to bey-smooth 
if it does not ha1Je any prime factor ezceeding 11 {Sj. 
This is a simple definition, but it is imperative to look at an example. 
Example S.l.l (Smooth Number). A 15-smooth number is an integer 
whose complete prime factorization consists of the set of primes {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 
13} each of which are raised to some power. 5S is a 15-smooth number since 
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52= 22 ·13. Similarly, S94909B.40 is also 15-smooth because 
234903240 = ~ . 35 . 5 ·11·133• 
Just as we limited the size of the prime factors we used in the Quadratic 
Sieve, we will use smooth numbers to bound the size of the prime factors 
we are examining in the Elliptic Curve Method. 
3.2 Euclidean Algorithm 
The next concept that will play a role in the ECM is the Euclidean Al-
gorithm. This algoritlun is designed to find the greatest common divisor, 
denoted gcd, of two integers a and b, even if the prime factors of a and b are 
UI!known. 
To find gcd(a, b), where a > b, we first divide b into a and write down 
the quotient q1 and the remainder r1 such that a = q1b + r1. Next, we 
perform a second division with b playing the role of a and r1 playing the 
role of b. We will have an equation of the form b = q'2r1 + r2. Next, we 
will divide r2 into r1 to obtain the equation r1 = 113'"2 + ra. We continue in 
this W!lY, each time dividing the previous remainder into the second-to-last 
remainder, obtaining a new quotient and remainder. When we finally obtain 
a new remainder that evenly divides the previous remainder, we are done 
and the final nonzero remainder is the greatest common divisor of a and b. 
Here is a clearer picture of the steps involved in the algorithm: 
a= q1b+r1 
b = t12r1 + r2 
r1 = 113'"2 + ra 
r;-a = (/j-1r; -2 + r;-1 
r;-2 = q;r;-1 + 0 
Since r;-1lr;-2 then we are done, and gcd(a, b) = r;-1· 
Example 3.2.1 (Euclidean Algorithm). Find the gcd(1987, 521) wing the 
Euclidean Algorithm. 
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1987 = 3 . 521 + 424 
521 = 1 . 424 + 97 
424 = 4 . 97 + 36 
97= 2. 36+25 
36 = 1·25+11 
25 = 2 ·11 +3 
11=3·3+2 
3=1·2+1 
2=2·1+0 
We loolc to our final nonzero remainder which is 1, so gcd(1987, 521) = 1. 
It is then possible to write the gcd as a linear combination of a and b. 
Start at the last step of the Euclidean Algorithm in which you had a nonzero 
remainder, this is the gcd, rewrite the equation as r;-1 = r;-3- {tJ;-1r;-2), 
then work your way backwards rewriting r;-1 in terms of earlier and earlier 
remainders, until you finally get to a and b: 
r;-1 = r;-3 - (tJ;-lr;-2) 
- r;-3- q;-1(r;-4- tl;-2,.;-3) 
= (q;-1tl;-2 + l)r;-3 - t1;-1r;-4 
= (tJ;-1tl;-2 + l)(r;-5- tJ;-sr;-4)- tJ;-1r;-4 
= ua+vb for some u, t1 E Z. 
Example 3.2.2 (Linear Combination using Euclidean Algorithm). If we 
return to &ample 9.~.1, we can write 1 as a linear combination of 1981 
and 5S1. 
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1 
-
3-1·2 
= 3 - 1 . (11 - 3 . 3) 
= 4·3-1·11 
= 4 . {25 - 2 . 11) -1 . 11 
- 4· 25-9·11 
= 4 . 25 - 9 . {36 - 1 . 25) 
-
13.25-9.36 
= 13 . (97- 2 . 36) - 9 . 36 
= 13 . 97 - 35 . 36 
= 13 . 97 - 35 . ( 424 - 4 . 97) 
= 153 . 97 - 35 . 424 
= 153 . (521.- 1 . 424) - 35 . 424 
= 153 . 521 - 188 . 424 
-
153.521-188. (1987- 3. 521) 
= 717.521-188 ·1987 
Thus, we can express 1 as the following linear combination of 581 and 1981: 
717.521-188 · 1987 = 1. 
The Euclidean Algorithm can be used to find multiplicative inverses 
when we are working (mod m). For some x e Z, the multiplicative inverse 
of x (mod m), denoted x-1 , satisfies the equation x · x-1 = 1 (mod m). 
Also, the multiplicative inverse exists if and only if gcd(x, m) = 1. To find 
the multiplicative inverse of x, write x and m as a linear combination such 
that ux +vm = gcd{x,m) = 1, for. integers u and v. Note that if we rewrite 
x · x-1 = 1 (mod m) using the definition of cogruences, then we have: 
X · X-l = 1 + km for k E Z 
or 
x · x-1 - km = 1. 
We can see that the equation above is close to our linear combination 
equation: ux + vm = 1. By letting v = -k, we can solve for u, and we have 
found the multiplicative inverse of x (mod m). 
Example 3.2.3 {Multiplicative Inverse). Returning once more to our pretli-
ous examples, if we wanted to find the multiplicative inverse of 521 (mod 1987), 
we would first check that the gcd(521, 1987) = 1. We found in Example 3.8.1 
that indeed this is true. Next, we would express1 as a linear combination of 
581 and 1981. From &ample 9.8.8, we found that 717 · 521 - 188 ·1987 = 1. 
If we let v = -188, then u = 717, and the multiplicative inverse of 521 
(mod 1987) is 111. That is, 521 · 717 = 1 (mod 1987). 
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3.3 Elliptic Curve Fundamentals 
Now we are ready to turn our attention to elliptic curves. The best place to 
begin is with the definition of an elliptic curve. 
Definition 3.3.1 (Elliptic Curve). Let K be a field of characteristic :f: 2, 3, 
and let x3 +ax+ b (where a, be K) be a cubic polynomial in K(x) with no 
multiple roots inK. An elliptic curve over K is the set of points (x, y) with 
x, y E K which satisfy the equation 
y2 = x3 + ax + b, 
together with a single element denoted 0, called the ~int at infinity"{4]. 
We will briefly discuss the point at infinity further below. Let us first 
discuss how an elliptic curve is graphed on the coordinate plane, assuming 
that K = R.. We are working with a cubic polynomial with no multiple 
roots which means that factoring the polynomial will result in x3 +ax+ b = 
(x + h)(x + j)(x + k) where h,j, k E Rand h :/= j :/= k or we will have roots 
where h E R. and j, k E C. That is to say, that we will either have three 
real roots that are not equal to each other or we will have one real root and 
two complex roots. We know this to be true because complex roots occur in 
pairs. Now, we can visualize an elliptic curve as crossing the x-axis either 
once, as in Figure 3.11, or three times, as in Figure 3.2. Also, if we are 
working over the real numbers, an elliptic curve will be symmetric about 
the x-axis because of the y2 term. Thus, for an elliptic curve equation, for 
every x-va.lue on the ~~ there exists either a corresponding positive and 
negative y-va.lue, or 11 ~ 0. 
3.4 Elliptic Curve Addition 
Now that we can visualize the graph of an elliptic curve over the real num-
bers, let us examine how two points are added. The set E defined by Defi-
nition 3.3.1 is a group under addition, which will be proved after geometric 
and algebraic representations of addition of points are given. 
Definition 3.4.1 (Geometric addition of points on elliptic curves). Let E be 
an elliptic curve defined by Definition 9.9.1, and consider P and Q to be two 
points on E. If a point P = (x,y) then-Pis defined to be -P = (x, -y). 
We hatJe four dif!erent cases for addition: 
Case 1: P is any point and Q is the point at infinity, 0. Then -Q is 
defined to be 0, P + 0 = P, and 0 + P = P. 0 is called the additiue identity 
of the elliptic curve group. 
1 All of the figures have been created using [5] 
21 
I 
i 
\ 
\ 
' 
Figure 3.1: Elliptic curve with one real root. 
Figure 3.2: Elliptic curve with three real roots 
Case· S: P and Q are two distinct points, P-:/:- -Q, and neither P nor 
Q are the point at infinity, 0. To add points P and Q, a line is dmwn 
through the two points and it will intersect the curoe at e:I:actly one more 
point, which we will call-R. The point -R is then reflected over the x-a:J:is 
to the point R. We now have, P + Q = R. See Figure 3.3. 
Case 3: P and Q are the same point, that is, P = Q. Also, P-:/:- (x, 0) 
and neither P nor Q are the point 0. To add a point P to itself, a tangent 
line is dmwn at the point P which will intersect the curoe at e:I:actly one other 
point, -R. -R is reflected across the z-a:J:is to the point R. This opemtion 
is called doubling the point P. This case represents P + P = 2P = R. See 
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Figure 3.3: Adding distinct points P and Q 
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Figure 3.4: Doubling the point P 
Case ..t: P is any point :I- 0, and Q = -P. The line through P and 
- P is a 'Vertical line which does not intersect the elliptic curoe at a third 
point and cannot be added as in Case ! or Case 3. This case represent& 
P+Q=P+(-P)=O. Similarly, (-P)+P=O. SeeFigure3.5. 
Geometrically speaking, 0 can be thought of 88 sitting at the very top 
of the y-axis and the very bottom of the y-axis. 
The addition of two points on elliptic curves is not the same as point-wise 
addition. While this may have been apparent in the geometric interpreta-
tion, it can be seen explicitly with algebraic definitions which correspond to 
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Figure. 3.5: Adding P and -P 
each of the four cases from Definition 3.4.1. 
Definition 3.4.2 (Algebraic addition of points on elliptic curves). Let E 
be an elliptic curoe defined by Definition 9.9.1. Let P = (ZlJJil) and 
Q = (z2, 112) be two arbitrary points on the curoe that are not necessar-
ily distinct. We hatJe four different cases for addition: 
Co.se 1: P+O=P andO+P=P. 
Case !: If P-:/- Q and P ~ -Q, then P + Q = (za, 113) with 
(112 -Y1) 2 ZS = -Zl-Z2 Z2- Zl 
113 = -y1 + (z1 - zs). ( t/2- Y1) Z2 -Zl (3.4.1) 
Case 9: If P = Q and P :1= (z1, 0), then 2P = (zs, ys) with 
- (3z~ + a)2- 2zl 
zs 2yl 
113 - -yl + ( 3zJ: a) (z1- zs). (3.4.2) 
Case 4: If P = -Q, then P+ (-P) = 0 and (-P) + P = 0. 
3.5 Elliptic Curve Group Law 
Elliptic curves are a group under addition. Let P = (z1, Jll) and Q = (z2, 712) 
be two arbitrary points on the elliptic curve defined by Definition 3.3.1. 
There are four different cases for closure. 
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Case 1: Geometrica.lly, when the arbitrary point P is added to the point 
at infinity, 0, a vertical line is drawn that intersects these two points. The 
vertical line crosses the elliptic curve at a third point, -P, which is then 
reflected across the z-a.xis to the point P. Thus, P + 0 = P, and by a 
similar argument 0 + P = P. 
Cases 2 and 3: The following theorem will be applied to prove closure 
for both Cases 2 and 3. 
Theorem 8.5.1. If a monic cubic polynomial, z3 + cz2 + ax + b, where 
a, b, c E R, has three real roots, h, j, and k, then -c = h + j + k. 
Proof. Let zS + cz2 +ax+ b, where a, b, c e Ill, be a monic cubic polynomial. 
Assume zS + cz2 +ax+ b = (z- h)(h- j)(z- k) where h, j, k E R. Then, 
z3 + cz2 + az + b = (z- h)(h- j)(z- k) 
= (z2 - jz- hz + hj)(z- k) 
=~-~-~+~-~+~+~-~ 
= z3 - (k + j + h)x2 + (jk + hk + hj}x- hjk 
Thus, cz2 = -(k + j + h}z2, which implies that -c = k + j +h. D 
The next theorem proves that for Cases 2 and 3, a third point, -R can 
always be generated. 
Theorem 3.6.2. Let P = (x1, 711) and Q = (z2, 712) be t:wo real points on 
the elliptic cun~e y2 = x3 + ax+ b, where P :f: Q :f- 0 and P :f: -Q. A line, 
l, can be drawn through P and Q that will intersect the elliptic cun~e at one 
more point, -R = (xs, -11s). 
Proof. Assume P = (x1, 711) and Q = (x2,712) are two real roots to the 
equation y2 = z 3 + ax+ b. We know that the .third root, (xs, -71s), must 
also be real because complex roots occur in pairs. If m is the slope of the 
line, l, that passes through P and Q, then the equation for l is 
71 - 111 = m(x - Xl) 
11 = mz + (111 - mz1). 
If we let r = 1/1 - mz1 1 then our equation for l becomes 11 = mx + r. A point 
will be on both l and the elliptic curve i1f 
(mx +r)2 = x3 +ax+b 
m
2
x
2 + 2mxr + r2 = z 3 + ax + b 
0 = x3 - m2x2 +(a- 2mr)x+ (b- r2). (3.5.3} 
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Since P and Q lie both on l and the elliptic curve, then they are roots to 
equation 3.5.3. By Theorem 3.5.1, the third root, (:z:s, -113), will satisfy the 
equation 
-(-m2) = z1 +:z:2 +:z:s 
Zs = m 2 - Zl - :1:2. 
To find -ys, we plug zs into our equation for l, so 
-Ys - m:z:s + r 
= m:z:s + (Ill - mzl) 
= m(zs - z1) +Ill· 
(3.5.4) 
(3.5.5) 
Thus, -R = (:z:a, -ya) will be the thlrd point on the elliptic curve and l if 
z3 and -ya satisfy equations 3.5.4 and 3.5.5, respectively. 0 
Notice that if P and Q are distinct points, and if P :F -Q (as in Case 
2 from Definition 3.4.2), then the slope of the line through these two points 
will be m = (:::). If P = Q and if P :F (z,O) (as in Case 3 from 
Definition 3.4.2), then the slope of the tangent line can be found using 
implicit differentiation. The point P = (:~:1, f/I) satisfies the equation yf = 
zf + a:z:1 + b. Differentiating this equation yields: 
yf = :z:f + O:Z:l + b 
21111/t = 3:z;f + a 
~ _ 3:z:~+a 
1 - 2111 
Thus, the slope of the line through P is m = ( 3'2-t~a.) . 
To add points P and Q, plug the particular slope minto equations 3.5.4 
and 3.5.5, then reflect the point -Rover the :z:-axis. The point R is obtained 
which corresponds to equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
Case 4: When adding the two points P and -P, the line that connects 
these two points is vertical and it intersects the elliptic curve at a third 
point, 0. Thus, P+ (-P) = 0, and similarly, (-P) +P = 0 . 
The proof of associativity is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a 
proof may be found in [3]. It can be seen from Case 1 under closure that 
0 is the additive identity. Since 0 is the identity, then it can be seen from 
Case 4 under closure that - P is the additive inverse of P . Thus, elliptic 
curves are a group under addition. 
The following is an example of adding two points on a specific elliptic 
curve. 
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Example 3.5.1 (Adding two points on an elliptic curve). Let E be the el-
liptic cunJe y2 = x3 -8x+3 from Figures 9.3, 9 . .4, and 9.5 We shall examine 
only Cases ~, 3, and 4 for addition. 
Case~: Let P = (-2.7, -2.25) and Q = (0, 1.74). Since P =F Q, then 
X3 - (1.74- (-2.25))2- (-2.7)- 0 
0- (-2.7) 
= 4.88 
Ys = -(-2.25) + ( 1·~4--(~~~:,~5)) (-2.7- (4.88)) 
- -8.95 
Thus, P + Q = R where R = (4.88, -8.95). 
Case 9: Let P = (-.308,2.34). Find 2P. 
:z:s - (3( -.aoar:~ + ( -8)) 2 - 2(- 308) 
2(2.34) . 
- 3.33 
Y3 - -2.34+ (3(-.3~(~.:~ (-8)) (-.308-3.33) 
- 3.65 
Thus, 2P = R where R = (3.33,3.65). 2 
Case 4: Let P = (3,2.45) and Q = (3, -2.45). If we had ignored the fact 
that P = -Q and had added P+(-P} as in Case~~ then we would have ron 
into trouble when calculating the denominator, (::2-:Z:I) = (3-3) = 0. This 
is our signal that P + (-P) must be 0, the point at infinity. This important 
concept will appear later in the ECM algorithm. 
3.6 Elliptic Curves- reduction modulo p 
Rather than working with elliptic curves over the real numbers, we shall 
narrow our definition so that we can work over the prime numbers (mod p), 
denoted lF 11•• We will start by defining these particular elliptic curves. 
Definition 3.6.1 (Elliptic Curve mod p). For elements a, b in the field 
F~, where p is prime and k > 0, with discriminant condition gcd(4a3 + 
21~,p) = 1, an elliptic cun1e over the field is the set 
E(o,b)(lF~) = {(::, y) E F~ x F~ltl = x3 +a::+ b} U {0} (3.6.6) 
where 0 is the point at infinity. 
2The dift'erence between my solutions and those from the figures is an effect of rounding. 
I hiiMl W!ed Maple to compute my solutions and did not round until the end. 
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The discriminant condition that gcd( 4a3+27il', p) = 1 allows us to ensure 
that our elliptic curve has no multiple roots (mod p) [4]. 
Once again, it is not possible to add points on our elliptic curve using 
point-wise addition. It is also not possible to represent addition geomet-
rically as we did previously since we are no longer working over the real 
numbers. Therefore, we will modify the algebraic definitions from Defini-
tion 3.4.2 so that we are working in :F,ao. 
Definition 3.6.2 (Addition of Points on an Elliptic Curve mod p). Let 
P = (:r:1, 111) and Q = (:r:2, :112) be two points on the elliptic curtJe E(Fp~~ ), 
where p is prime and 1c > 0. To find P + Q = (:r:s, Ys), there are four cases: 
Case 1: P+ 0 = P. 
Case ~: If P =f: Q and P :f: -Q, then 
Xs = (:112 -yl)(:r;2 - Xl)-1 -XI - :1:2 (mod p) 
f/3 = -y1 + (712- Yl)(:r:2- xl)-1 (:r:l - :r:s) (mod p). 
Case 3: If P = Q and P =f: (:r:1, 0), then 
:r:s = ((3:r:~ + a)(2yt)-1)2 - 2:r:1 (mod p) 
11s = -YI + (3:r:¥ + a)(2YI)-1(:r:l - :r:s) (mod p). 
Case .4: If P = -Q, then P+ (-P) = 0. 
Elliptic curves (mod p) are still a group since the addition operation is 
closed and associative. The point at infinity, 0 remains the additive identity 
and - P is the additive inverse of P 
3. 7 Hasse's Theorem 
This next theorem is attributed to H. Hasse which helps us to find the order 
of our elliptic curve, that is, the number of points on the curve. By knowing 
the order of the elliptic curve on a given :field, we can choose some necessary 
bounds more wisely and decrease the running time for ECM. 
Theorem 3.7.1 (Hasse's Theorem). Let F11 be the finite field of q = rJc 
elements for some prime p and integer 1c > 0. Let N be the number of 
points on an elliptic curtJe defined ot1er Fq. Then 
IN- (q + 1)1 ~ 2Jij'. (3.7.7) 
This theorem is saying that the order of E(a,b)(F11), represented by N, 
can be bounded by (q + 1)- 2-ft~ N ~ (q + 1) +2-ft. We do not have a 
formula to compute the exact order of an elliptic curve over a finite :field, so 
this theorem is extremely useful. 
28 
3.8 Elliptic Pseudocurves 
Once more, we want to alter our definition so that we can work over the 
integers (mod n), denoted Z,.. Remember that n is the integer we are 
trying to factor. 
Definition 8.8.1 {Elliptic Pseudocurve). For elements a, b in the ring Zn 
with gcd(n,6) = 1 and discriminant condition gcd(4a3 + 2762, n) = 1, an 
elliptic pseudocuroe OtJer the ring is a set 
E(o,b)(Z,.) = {(z, y) E Zn x Znl112 = z3 +ax+ b} U {0} (3.8.8) 
where 0 is the point at infinity. /Sf 
This definition is similar to our definition for elliptic curves over the field 
IF,ao. We use the term pseudocurve since n is composite and the points on 
the curve do not form a group under addition and thus, cannot be a field. 
The discriminant condition that gcd( 4a3 + 2762, n) = 1 allows us to ensure 
that our elliptic curve has no multiple roots (mod p) for any prime divisor 
p of n [4). 
Addition is almost identical to Definition 3.6.2, however each point is 
now reduced (mod n). 
Definition 3.8.2 (Addition of Points on an Elliptic Pseudocurve). Let 
P = (x1, 111) and Q = (x2, 712) be two points on the elliptic pseudocuroe 
E(Z,.). To find P + Q = (zs, Ys), there are four ooses: 
Case 1: P + 0 = P. 
Case S: If P ¥: Q and P #: -Q, then 
xs = (112 - 111)(x2- zt)-1 - :z:1 - z2 (mod n) (3.8.9) 
tis = -111 + (t/2 -111)(z:~ - z1)-1(z1 - xs) (mod n). 
Case 9: If P = Q and P #: (xt, 0), then 
zs = ((3x~ + a)(2Yt)-1)2 - 2z1 {mod n) (3.8.10) 
J13 = -y1 + (3z! + a)(2111)-:-1(x1 - zs) (mod n). 
Case .4: If P = -Q, then P+ (-P) = 0. 
Since Zn is not a field when n is composite, then (x2 - :z:1) and (2yl) 
(from Cases 2 and 3) do not always have multiplicative inverses . (mod n). 
Thus, the points P and Q cannot always be added to obtain the point R. 
This is the reason why the points on an elliptic pseudocurve do not form a 
group under addition. 
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3.9 ECM Algorithm 
The time has come to examine the Elliptic Curve Method using the concepts 
that have been previously. discussed. The objective of ECM is to compute 
kP (mod n) where n is the number we are trying to factor, Pis a point on 
an elliptic pseudocurve, and k is some integer to be chosen. We will find a 
factor of n when kP ::/: 0 (mod n), where 0 is the point at infinity. The 
result kP ::/: 0 (mod n) signals that we were not able to find the inverse ·of 
(2y1) or (x2- x1) from Definition 3~8.2. If the inverse does not exist, this 
means that gcd(n, 2yl) ::/: 1 or gcd(n, x2 - x1) ::/: 1, which then leads to a 
factor of n . The algorithm has been broken down into steps to distinguish 
each idea. An example will be given at the end to make the ideas clearer. 
First Step: Pick a random elliptic pseudocurve, E(a,b)(Z,.) . The easiest 
way to do this is by first selecting a point P(x, y) E Zn x Zn and a E Z,.. 
Next, find b by computing b = y2 - x3 - ax (mod n). After you have an 
elliptic pseudocurve, check the discriminant condition: 
If g = n, then pick a new elliptic pseudocurve. If g > 1, then we have 
found a factor of n and the algorithm is done before even really beginning. 
Unfortunately, this is extremely unlikely to occur. Lastly, if g = 1, then 
continue on to the next step with the particular elliptic curve and point, 
(E, P). 
Second Step: Choose two positive integer bounds, B and C. B is our 
smoothness bound. Recall from Section 3.1 that a B-smooth number is an 
integer containing n.O prime factor greater than B. We want to choose a 
value of B large enough so that we increase our chances of finding a prime 
factor, but not so large that it makes our running time inefficient. We want 
to choose a C to bound the p~ divisors pjn. We set our bound C so that 
p+ 1+2y'jj < c for p near -Iii (3.9.11) 
The reason for this bound will be seen in the explanation as to why this 
algorithm works. 
Third Step: We want to take the primes that are B-smooth, denoted 
.P\1 and raise them to the highest possible power while remaining below the 
bound C, denoted p~. Next, we shall take the produCt of these primes and 
call this value k. That is, find k such that 
where Pi S B and p';' S 0. 
Fourth Step: All of the necessary information has been collected and 
initialized to run through the sequencing phase of the algorithm. Compute 
kP (mod n), for the initial point P on the pseudocurve E(a,b)(Z,.) . . This is 
done by repeatedly adding the point P to itself k times. To speed up the 
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algorithm, it is possible to break down each computation into a combina.-
tion of doubling and addition; for example 3P = P + 2P, which uses both 
equations 3.8.9 and 3.8.10. . 
Since part of the addition algorithm includes finding the inverses, (2f,ll.)-1 
and (x2 - x1)-1, we will use the Euclidean Algorithm from Section 3.2 
to compute d = gcd(n, 2y1) or d = gcd(n, X2 - x1), dependent on the 
case. This will occur each time the point P is doubled or added. Consider 
the possibilities for the greatest common divisor function. If d :f: 1, then 
the algorithm will stop because the inverse does not exist. This means 
that we have either found a nontrivial divisor of n, or n itself is obtained. 
A nontrivial divisor means that we have finished the task we set out to 
accomplish. Suppose n is obtained; then we want to find a new elliptic 
pseudocurve E and point P. If d = 1, then an inverse has been found and the 
sequence can continue. If we are fully able to compute kP (mod n) without 
running into any trouble computing inverses, then we can either expand the 
smoothness bound B, or choose another point and elliptic pseudocurve. 
Why does this method work? If p and q are two prime divisors of n, then 
the elliptic pseudocurve, E(c,b)(Zn) implies the same curve for (mod p) and 
(mod q). Since p and q are. prime, then these two smaller elliptic curves are 
groups under addition on F p and lF q. Let Np and N 11 be the order of the 
groups, respectively. If kP = 0 (mod p), then by Lagrange's Theorem, k 
will divide Np. This is also true of the elliptic curve E(a,II}(Fq)· Since E(a,ll) 
was chosen randomly, then Np and N9 are random numbers close to p + 1 
and q + 1, respectively. Thus, it is unlikely that Np and N11 share many 
common pl;'ime factors, and it is likely that kP = 0 (mod p) but kP -::/: 0 
(mod q). If this is the case, then kP does not exist on the original curve 
and during the computations the gcd returned a non-trivial factor of n. 
From Hasse's Theorem 3. 7.1, we know that the order of the elliptic curve 
on lF P must be less than p + 1 + 2JP. Thus, k has been optimally selected to 
be large enough to ensure that kP can be equivalent to 0 (mod p); that is, 
kP will compute all of the points on the curve E(c,b}(lFp)· The bound from 
Hasse's Theorem provides an upper limit to decrease the running time for 
this algorithm. We have also chosen k to be B-smooth; if the order of the 
elliptic curve on lFp, N,)l is B-smooth, then k will be divisible by Np. If this 
is true then we can expect a factor of n [2]. 
3.10 Elliptic Curve Method Example 
Let n = 21913. This is a very small number, only 5 digits, but it will 
demonstrate the algorithm. Our first step is to pick a random pseudocurve 
and point, P . We shall begin with the point P = (1, 1) and a = 1; this 
implies that b = 12 - 13 - 1(1) = -1. Our elliptic pseudocurve is y2 = 
x3 + x -1. Next, we shall choose the smoothness bound, B = 7. Since n 
is so small, we don't need a large smoothness bound. The other bound, 0, 
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should be chosen so that p + 1 + 2y'P < C for some prime, p near ..jii ~ 148. 
We will pick 149 + 1 + 2v'i49 < 175 = C. This value for C means that we 
want to raise our 7-smooth primes to the highest power without exceeding 
175. For our primes, p, we have {27,34 ,53, ~}.We can take the product of 
these integers to find k = 27 . 34 . 53 · 72. 
We are now ready to compute kP (mod n). We will be using a program 
written in Maple to speed up our computations; see Appendix A. We will 
successively multiply P by 2 seven times, then by 3 four times, then by 5 
three times, and then by 7 two times all the while reducing (mod n). As 
we first try multiplying P by 27, we we find that the program is able to 
calculate (~P) + P, but then sends an error on the next iteration. The 
copy of the Maple program for this specific example is listed below. We 
want to find gcd(z2- z1, n) for Zl = 1 and z:~ = 20418 since these are the 
two z-values that would be added together for the next iteration. We find 
that gcd(20418 - 1, 21913) = 17. Thus, 17 is a factor of 21913. We have 
successfully factored 21913 = 17 · 1289. 
> KultPo1nt(2-7, 21913, 1, 1, 1); 
2, 21910 
13, 47 
21305, 13290 
13407, 826 
16123, 13697 
3485, 21135 
10990, 10186 
18767, 21811 
11211, 10603 
17884, 13001 
17925, 10458 
6284, 13267 
10510, 19282 
13018, 11360 
6428, 14164 
20418, 20807 
Error, (in AddXs) the modular inverse does not exist 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
The Quadratic Sieve and Elliptic Curve Method have been big steps in 
mathematics for factoring integers. They are just some of the tools that 
can be used when attempting to factor a number. If the integer is between 
SG--150 digits, QS is probably the optimal algorithm. However, if it appears 
that the integer will have several "smaller" prime factors, then ECM is the 
optimal algorithm. If an integer has size beyond the bounds of QS or the 
Number Field Sieve, then it is possible that ECM may be able to pull out 
smaller factors and leave the remaining integer to be factored by a more 
powerful algorithm. 
Even with these advances in factoring integers, RSA is still secure be-
cause of the size of integers used. Many websites that use RSA to send 
secure information over the internet are using a modulus n that is larger 
than 300 digits. There is no algorithm in existence that can factor such a 
large number in a reasonable amount of time. Once algorithms are created 
or improved to factor such a large number, then the integers used in RSA 
will be increased to keep our information secure. 
There is also another reason for interest in factorizations other than its 
useful applications to cryptography. Factoring numbers has a long history 
dating back before the days of ~uclid and his algorithm. It's interesting to 
see that such a time old question of the make-up of an integer is still being 
asked. Results from Euclid, to Fermat, to Euler, to Legendre, to Lenstra, 
to Pomerance build upon one another to constantly improve our methods 
for finding factors. It seems that as time goes on, the question will remain 
the same, but the approach will change. 
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Appendix A 
First 
Maple Program for Multiplying a point P on an Elliptic Curve: For the 
following program, let E be the pseudocurve, y2 = :c3 + a:r: + b with point 
flJ = (:r:l,yl) and P<J = (:r:2,y2). 
>\\This small program adds only the x-values according 
to the definition of elliptic curve addition mod n 
Addis :• proc (n. a, x1, yl, x2, y2) 
local x3; 
if x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 then 
x3 :• ' (((3•xt•2 + a)•(2•yt)•(-1))•2- 2•x1) mod n; 
else 
x3 :• (((y2 - y1)•(x2 - xt)•(-1))•2 - x1 - x2 ) mod n; 
end if 
end proc; 
>\\This small program adds only the y-values according 
to the definition of elliptic curve addition mod n 
AddYs :• proc (n, a, x1, y1, x2, y2, x3) 
local y3; 
if x1 = x2 and y1 • y2 then 
y3 := (-y1 + (3•(x1)•2 + a)(2yt)•(-1)•(x1- x3))mod n; 
else 
· y3 := (-y1 + (y2-y1)•(x2-xt)•(-1)•(x1 - x3)) mod n; 
end if 
end proc; 
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>\\This program multiplies the point P times some integer k 
HultPoint :a proc (k, n, a, xl, yl) 
} 
local j, x3, y3, x4, y4; 
j :• 1; 
x3 :• x1; 
y3 :- y1; 
for j while j < k do 
x4 :• AddXs(n, a, xl, yl, x3, y3); 
y4 := AddYs(n, a, x1, yl, x3, y3, x4); 
j+1; 
print(x4, y4); 
x3 :=- x4; 
y3 :• y4 
end do; 
x4, y4 
end proc; 
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